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Commandments, Crosses, & Prayers: The Roberts
Court’s Approach to Public Religion
INTRODUCTION
Few topics divide the American public more than the
government’s use of religious expressions and symbols (i.e., public or
civil religion). However, the American public is not alone in its
disagreement over how to best resolve this perplexing issue of public
or civil religion. 1 The Supreme Court has also struggled to
determine a consistent approach to this matter, 2 striving to balance
the requirements of the Establishment Clause of the U.S.
Constitution 3 with the need for a unifying belief system and the
importance and prevalence of religion in the lives of American
citizens and the United States as a whole. 4
Most recently, the Roberts Court has attempted to find this
balance through three cases: Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 5
Salazar v. Buono, 6 and Town of Greece. v. Galloway. 7 In all three of
these cases, the Roberts Court has allowed the government to
include religious expressions in its activities as long as the activity’s
main purpose is not to promote religion. For reasons discussed
below, this approach squarely rejects the argument that religious
expressions should be completely excluded from government

1. Public religion and civil religion will be used interchangeably in this paper even
though there might be slight differences in meaning.
2. Justice Scalia has previously said that the Court’s approach to Establishment Clause
cases is “neither a settled, nor a consistent, nor even a rational line of authority that you could
rely on even if you wanted to.” JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND
CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 69 (2009).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . .”).
4. See infra Part III.B.
5. 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
6. 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
7. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). In choosing these cases, others have been left out because
they did not address the issue at hand. For example, Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (plurality opinion), was left out because it dealt with
standing and not the merits of public religion. For a look at the Roberts Court’s analysis of
this case, see Carl H. Esbeck, What the Hein Decision Can Tell Us About the Roberts Court and
the Establishment Clause, 78 MISS. L.J. 199 (2008).
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activities. 8 However, the Court also suggests that the government
may not preclude any religion from expressing itself when another
is allowed to do so. This second principle in the Court’s analysis
ensures that the government does not favor any religion over
another in governmental expression. Despite vehement objections
to any form of civil religion, this two-step approach best fosters an
American community and allows formal recognition of religion’s
important influence on our government and our society without
violating the Establishment Clause. It leads to a new type of public
religion that allows for the governmental expression of all beliefs in
pursuit of transcending our differences in the pursuit of the
common good.
This Comment discusses the Court’s approach in fostering the
idea of a public religion. Part I gives a background on American civil
religion, its purpose and form, and then explores some of the
criticism and proposed alternatives offered by scholars, along with
the defects of these alternatives. Part II then summarizes and
analyzes three cases where the Roberts Court has looked at religion
in the public square, showing how its approach squarely rejects the
arguments against the government sanctioning religious expressions
in its affairs. The Court’s analysis also suggests that the government
cannot force either the exclusion or the inclusion of non-Christians
in these expressions. Part III argues that these principles effectively
overcome the problems with civil religion raised by critics and
addresses the defects found in the proposed alternatives instead of
adopting any one of those alternatives. Part IV concludes.
I. AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION
A. Background
Many have argued that in order for a nation to truly function it
needs to have an identity and sense of community. 9 In other words,
8. See infra Part II.
9. Steven D. Smith, “Sectarianizing” Civil Religion? A Comment on Gedicks and
Hendrix, 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 307, 311 (2007) (“[A] political community . . . is composed of
people who understand themselves—or imagine themselves—to be in some sense united by
common ties or commitments.”); see also Silvio Ferrari, Civil Religions: Models and Perspectives,
41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 749 (2010)); Smith, supra, at 311 n.9 (quoting BENEDICT
ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 6 (rev. ed. 1991) (“‘[A]ll communities larger than
primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined.’ Such a
community ‘is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know
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it must give citizens more than simply a legal status or right; it must
give them an identity as members of a political community. 10 This
“entails sharing a common narrative, partaking in some foundational
myths, and developing a sense of belonging, solidarity, and
commitment.” 11 This community also requires a common set of
values. 12 To create this community and identity, nations need to have
“common ties and commitments . . . includ[ing] public, communal
affirmations of what are widely taken to be important, unifying
truths.” 13 In the past, a state church usually filled this need, “linking
senses of past, present and future with communal institutions and
authority.” 14 But when there is no such church, a civil religion often
develops to meet “the need for some sense of transcendent unity,” 15
and provides a “framework within which national identity is
redefined, thus allowing changes to take place without breaking too
sharply from the past.” 16
The idea of civil religion traces back to the eighteenth-century
writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau 17 but was reinvigorated more

most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives
the image of their communion.’”).
10. Ferrari, supra note 9, at 750 n.5 (quoting Christian Joppke, Transformation of
Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity, in CITIZENSHIP BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 36, 37
(Engin F. Isin, Peter Nyers & Bryan S. Turner eds., 2008)).
11. Id. at 750. To support this idea, Ferrari gives the example of “the U.S. oath of
allegiance for naturalized citizens,” which has the person renounce all previous
allegiances, declare their willingness to “support and defend the Constitution” and its
laws, and make these commitments freely, finishing with “so help me God.” Id. at 750
n.6 (quoting U.S. CITIZENSHIP & NATURALIZATION SERVS., No. M-476, A G UIDE TO
NATURALIZATION 28 (2010)).
12. Id. at 749 (describing how nations “search for a nucleus of values able to create a
cohesive group of individuals”).
13. Smith, supra note 9, at 311.
14. Yehudah Mirsky, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237,
1248 (1986).
15. Id. at 1251; see also Ferrari, supra note 9, at 749 (citing ROBERT BELLAH, THE
BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN TIME OF TRIAL 3 (1975)) (“When a
particular religion or culture cannot perform this unifying role, civil religion takes its place by
providing a set of values, symbols, and rituals upon which the spiritual unity and social
cohesion of a nation can be rebuilt.”).
16. Ferrari, supra note 9, at 749.
17. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT bk.4, ch.8, at 130 (Roger D.
Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans., St. Martin’s Press 1978) (1762) (“There is, therefore, a
purely civil profession of faith, the articles of which are for the sovereign to establish, not
exactly as religious dogmas, but as sentiments of sociability without which it is impossible to be
a good citizen or a faithful subject.”).
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recently by Robert Bellah. 18 Bellah defined America’s version as a
“public religious dimension . . . expressed in a set of beliefs,
symbols, and rituals,” 19 such as prophets, martyrs, “sacred events
and sacred places,” and “solemn rituals and symbols.” 20 He
emphasized that it “is not the worship of the American nation but
an understanding of the American experience in the light of
ultimate and universal reality” 21— in other words, a “vehicle of
national religious self-understanding.” 22 It is “based on the idea
that religion can play a helpful public role by fostering republican
virtues.” 23 However, it should be “neither sectarian nor in any
specific sense Christian,” nor is it “religion in general.” 24 Thus,
“[a]ll other religious opinions are outside the cognizance of the
state and may be freely held by citizens.” 25
In the United States, many of the colonies originally had some
form of a state church that created their colony’s identity and sense
of community. 26 Near the early nineteenth century, a civil religion
characterized as “‘Nonsectarian’ Christianity” began to develop and
eventually replaced all state churches. 27 The United States
distinguished itself from most European nations by formally
separating church and state. 28 However, this “[s]eparation . . . does
not affect the interaction of religion, politics, and society.” 29 Over
18. See, e.g., Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS 1 (1967).
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id. at 18.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 8.
23. Ferrari, supra note 9 at 756 (citing Robert N. Bellah, The Revolution and the
Civil Religion, in RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 55, 60 (Jerald C. Brauer et
al. eds., 1976).
24. Bellah, supra note 18, at 8.
25. Id. at 5.
26. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion: Judeo-Christianity
and the Ten Commandments, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 279 (2007) (citing Michael W.
McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of
Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2110–11 (2003)); see also Bellah, supra note 18, at 8
(explaining the status of state churches in each of the colonies).
27. Id. at 280–81 (citing Bellah, supra note 18, at 4.) (describing a “‘civil religion,’
which linked American citizenship and loyalty to a ‘nonsectarian’ Christian understanding that
the United States has a divine origin and destiny”); see also Ferrari supra note 9, at 756
(labeling it a “non-denominational civil religion”).
28. Ferrari, supra note 9, at 756.
29. Id. at 756 (citing Bellah, supra note 18, at 3). Ferrari gives two examples of such
separation. First, “[w]hile it prevents the teaching of religion in public schools, it does not
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time, this civil religion expanded into a Judeo-Christian version that
included Catholics and Jews. 30 The United States has kept this
Judeo-Christian civil religion, with little alteration, since the 1950s. 31
However, mass immigration from Asia has increased the number of
non-monotheistic religious people, in addition to the increase in the
number of Americans who are atheist or agnostic or who do not
belong to any particular church. 32 Thus, American civil religion has
existed in one form or another since the founding of the nation,
and—like all traditions—it has been the subject of much criticism,
especially over what form it should take 33 and if it should be followed
at all. 34
B. Problems and Alternatives
Critics have specified many problems with the current American
civil religion. First, in attempting to keep civil religion, the U.S.
Supreme Court uses unprincipled, inconsistent approaches that do
not adhere to traditional Establishment Clause tests. 35 Second, public
religion undermines our “commitment to pluralism” by having the
government favor certain religions’ symbols and terminology over
others, 36 specifically by ignoring and alienating those who do not
believe in monotheism. 37 Third, by allowing this civil religion, the
government is placing religion at the head of public discussions. 38
Fourth, civil religion contaminates sectarian religion and puts
pressure on the government to interpret religious symbols as lacking

prohibit the teaching about religions.” Id. Second, “it does not ban wearing religious symbols
in public institutions.” Id.
30. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 281–84.
31. See id.
32. See, e.g., id. at 285.
33. See, e.g., Mirsky, supra note 14.
34. See, e.g., Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 284.
35. Mirsky, supra note 14, at 1243–46.
36. Id. at 1240, 1246.
37. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 276, 301–02, 305; see also Ferrari supra note
9, at 757 (arguing that American civil religion’s “challenge is building a coherent and
functioning civil religion from different religious (and non-religious) sources. . . . [making it]
difficult to foresee how non-believers and followers of non-monotheistic religions can be
incorporated in the arena of full citizenship if it is crowded with symbols that are not theirs”).
38. Mirsky, supra note 14 at 1240 (“[Public religion] could clearly operate as a
vehicle for the establishment of a religious hegemony over the symbols and rhetoric of
public discourse.”).
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religious significance. 39 Fifth, and finally, conservative Christians are
increasingly advocating that the reach of public religion only include
their beliefs and ideas. 40
With all of these problems, some have argued that Americans
should modify or abolish civil religion entirely. 41 Indeed, the
following four alternatives have been either suggested or attempted,
ranging from significant involvement of religion in public affairs to
no involvement. The first alternative is to have a state church, such as
Catholicism. 42 In Italy, Catholic values “govern the ethical, cultural,
and religious plurality of the country.” 43 As an example, public
schools must hang a crucifix in every classroom, 44 because it is both a
“symbol of Italian identity,” ”manifest[ing] the historical and
cultural tradition of Italy and . . . a sign of a value system based on
freedom, equality, human dignity, and religious tolerance.” 45
The second alternative comes from legal scholar Yehudah
Mirsky. He proposed adopting a civil religion farther removed from
specific religions. 46 This civil religion would be based on five core
beliefs: 1) “[the] transcendent principle of morality to which [the]
polity is, or ought to be, responsible”; 2) “democracy as a way of
life for all people and a concomitant belief in an American mission
39. Id. (“[Public religion] poses a significant threat to the purity of ecclesiastical
institutions and to the transcendence of religious beliefs by its vague hallowing of public and
political life.”); see id. at 1247 (“[P]ublic religion’s legitimacy [is based] on its irrelevance.”);
see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 711–12 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted) (“To suggest, as the Court does, that [the crèche] symbol is merely ‘traditional’ and
therefore no different from Santa’s house or reindeer is not only offensive to those for whom
the crèche has profound significance, but insulting to those who insist for religious or personal
reasons that the story of Christ is in no sense a part of ‘history’ nor an unavoidable element of
our national ‘heritage.’”); Bellah, supra note 18, at 15; Ferrari supra note 9, at 757 (citing R.
Jonathan Moore, Civil Religion, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 63
(Catharine Cockson ed., 2003)) (asserting that an enlargement of American civil religion’s
border “is bound to dilute its content”).
40. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 278, 296–97, 300–01.
41. See id. at 285; Mirsky, supra note 14.
42. See Ferrari supra note 9, at 753–56. As previously mentioned, there have been some
efforts by conservative Christians in the U.S. to establish something similar to the Italian
version. See Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 278, 296–97, 300–01.
43. Ferrari supra note 9, at 753 (citing Camillo Ruini, President, It. Episcopal Conf.,
Quale spazio per il cristianesimo nella nuova Europa [Is There Room for Christianity in the New
Europe] (Feb. 11, 2005), http:// chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/23170).
44. Id. at 754 (citing Regio Decreto 30 aprile 1924, n. 965, art. 118, in G.U. 25
giugno 1924, n. 148 available at http://www.edscuola.eu/wordpress/?p=17510).
45. Id.
46. Mirsky, supra note 14, at 1249, 1252, 1256.
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to spread it the world over”; 3) “civil piety, that exercising the
responsibilities of citizenship is somehow a good end in itself”; 4)
“American religious folkways”; and 5) “Destiny ha[ving] great
things in store for the American people.” 47 To arrive at this form of
civil religion, he suggests changing current traditions and
terminology to remove any sign of sectarian elements. 48 For
example, he would replace legislative prayer with “the very
evocative ritual of a moment of silence,” and the National Day of
Prayer with a “National Day of Reflection.” 49 The key is that this
civil religion focuses on the political, not the sacral. 50
For the third alternative, Professors Frederick Mark Gedicks
and Roger Hendrix challenge the need for civil religion today. 51
They argue that the U.S. should abandon civil religion entirely and
instead develop “thin, procedural values, which permit individuals
to pursue their own conceptions of the good so long as they do not
interfere with that pursuit by others.” 52 In other words, they want
civil religion to be replaced by “purely secular beliefs” 53 or “thin,
procedural values” as the basis for our government and
community. 54 They argue that this would both remove any
alienation felt by non-monotheists and avoid a national identity
controlled by the majority religions.
Finally, in a version similar to Gedicks and Hendrix’s approach,
the fourth alternative of civil religion seeks to follow the French’s
approach of laïcité. 55 “Laïcité is seen as a cluster of universal and
abstract values—such as liberty, equality, and tolerance—that every

47. Id. at 1252.
48. Id. at 1256.
49. Id. He also suggests replacing “In God We Trust” with “a less sacral alternative”
and “distinguishing the Nativity of Christ from the pledge of allegiance and other practices of
civil religion that we are willing to accept by pointing to the essentially political character of
the pledge, couched in religious terminology though it may be.” Id.
50. Id. at 1249.
51. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26.
52. Id. at 305; see also Ferrari, supra note 9, at 763 n.66 (quoting Jan-Werner Müller &
Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Patriotism: An Introduction, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 67, 67
(2008)) (“The concept of constitutional patriotism designates the idea that political
attachment ought to center on the norms, the values, and, more indirectly, the procedures of a
liberal democratic constitution.”).
53. Smith, supra note 9, at 312–13.
54. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 305.
55. See Ferrari, supra note 9, at 751–53.
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citizen and group must embrace . . . .” 56 It seeks to “include[] and
reconcile[] the particular values of the religious, racial, ethnic,
cultural, and political communities living in France.” 57 This differs
from Gedicks and Hendrix’s approach in its public treatment of
religion. Its goal is to “shield[] [citizens] from the competing values
upheld by religions.” 58 It assumes that “not only the state and its
institutions, but also society and politics, have to be independent
from particular traditions and conceptions of life. . . . [As a result,]
these traditions are to be pushed to the margins of public life.” 59 For
example, French public schools are banned from teaching about any
religion and students cannot “wear[] religious symbols that are too
conspicuous in school.” 60
While each alternative has its own benefits, they each also face
important difficulties. In the first alternative, having a state church
forces other religions and beliefs to “accept [the state religion’s]
dominant position as the civil religion of the country,” something
that is becoming more difficult because of the growing plurality of
religions in most countries. 61 Despite the existence of many
religions and beliefs in the country, the government requires all
citizens to constantly conform their public behavior to only one
religion’s values. 62
The second alternative (Mirsky’s approach) would entirely strip
the religion out of civil religion. While it would still be a set of
beliefs and traditions, it would be devoid of any religious meaning
or symbols. This may seem an attractive option, but research
suggests that religion produces social goods better than secular

56. Id. at 751.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 753.
59. Id. (citing Jean Bauberot, Roberto Blancarte & Micheline Milot, Déclaration sur la
laïcité [Declaration of laïcité], in JEAN BAUBEROT, L’INTÉGRISME RÉPUBLICAIN CONTRE LA
LAÏCITÉ [The Republican Fundamentalism Against Secularism] 247–65 (2006)).
60. Id. at 752 (citing Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du
principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans
les écoles, collèges et lycées publics [Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004 Framing, Pursuant to
the Principle of Laïcité, the Wearing of Signs or Dress Denoting Religious Affiliation in Public
schools], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE], Mar. 15, 2004, p. 5190).
61. See id. at 755–56 (detailing how “non-Christian” immigrants struggle to accept
Catholicism’s established position as Italy’s civil religion).
62. See id.
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reasoning. 63 Some research suggests that “religious beliefs . . . are
more supportive of social justice and human rights than secular
discourse. . . .” 64 Similarly, some scholars have found that “religious
beliefs . . . command the assent of more citizens in this country
than . . . secular ‘public reason.’” 65 This is because “the coldness
and individualism of these procedural values make them unable to
create the solidarity, commitment, and feeling of belonging
required by a full citizenship.” 66 The states that have followed this
are arguably “no longer nations in the sense that they have lost the
ability to create the emotional commitment that once characterized
the national state.” 67
Both Gedicks and Hendrix’s solution and the French’s laïcité
confront the same issues as Mirsky’s. They also face additional
problems. First, “secular discourse is [generally not] ‘neutral’ toward
religion and inclusive of all citizens.” 68 If secular beliefs replace civil
religion, then religions in general may find themselves being treated
63. See Smith, supra note 9, at 313; see also ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 123, 130 (2013) (arguing that religion should be
promoted in America as a good because of the several benefits that religion produces).
64. Smith, supra note 9, at 313 n.16 (citing Michael J. Perry, Comment on The Limits of
Rationality and the Place of Religious Conviction: Protecting Animals and the Environment, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1067 (1985); see also JOHN COLEMAN, AN AMERICAN STRATEGIC
THEOLOGY 193–98 (1982) (footnotes omitted) (“[T]he strongest American voices for a
compassionate just community always appealed in public to religious imagery and sentiments.
The American religious ethic and rhetoric contain rich, polyvalent symbolic power to
command commitments of emotional depth, when compared to ‘secular’ language[,] Secular
Enlightenment language remains exceedingly ‘thin’ as a symbol system.”). Smith also cites
another Perry article that argues “that a religious rationale is necessary to justify human
rights.” Smith, supra note 9, at 313 n.16 (citing MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 11–41 (1998)).
65. Smith, supra note 9, at 313. (citing BRUCE LEDEWITZ, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
DEMOCRACY (2007)).
66. Ferrari, supra note 9, at 759. Ferrari similarly asserts “that, in the long run, a
citizenship based only on the cold exchange of rights and obligations is not viable; something
more, capable of warming the hearts of citizens, is required.” Id. at 750 (citing Tariq Modood,
Multiculturalism, Citizenship and National Identity, in CITIZENSHIP BETWEEN PAST AND
FUTURE 117 (Engin F. Isin, Peter Nyers & Bryan S. Turner eds., 2008)). He also agrees with
a German lawyer’s belief that “constitutional texts cannot create values, thus it is unfair to
expect that they can give citizens a feeling of belonging and solidarity.” Id. at 763 (citing Ernst
Wolfgang Böckenförde, Wahrheit und Freiheit: Zur Weltverantwortung der Kirche heute [Truth
and Freedom: To the World Responsibility of the Church Today], ZUR DEBATTE [THE
DEBATE], July 2004, at 5–6.).
67. Id. at 760.
68. Smith, supra note 9, at 313 (citing Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and
Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671 (1992)).
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as less valuable in the public than those ideologies and arguments
devoid of religion. 69 This unfairly discriminates against religion.
Additionally, these solutions do not answer an important question:
Will arguments and potential societal goods be rejected because of
their source (i.e. religion)? There is a growing rejection of all
arguments made by religious people whether they are based on
secular reasoning or not. 70 Removing religion entirely from
governmental expression would only fuel this notion that religion
cannot be used in the pursuit of societal or secular good.
Civil religion is based on the idea that even though we cannot
agree on all things, we can still agree on certain core principles and
those often involve some element of religion in one form of
another. 71 In fact, “no playing field is absolutely neutral and, for this
reason, the best way to deal with this dilemma is to reduce the
playing field’s rules to the minimum required for a fair game.” 72
Thus, with no improved solution found outside of the current civil
religion, this comment now look to the Roberts Court to see if its
approach can resolve these problems, by first summarizing the
relevant cases and then analyzing the Court’s pitfalls before offering
a new solution.
II. ROBERTS COURT CASE ANALYSIS
A. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum
The Roberts Court first addressed public religion in Pleasant
Grove City v. Summum. 73 In 2009, the Summum religion sued
Pleasant Grove City for violating the Free Speech Clause by
accepting a Ten Commandments Monument in its public park but
not accepting its proposed religious monument. 74 The city argued
that it “limit[ed] monuments in the Park to those that ‘either (1)
directly relate to the history of [the city], or (2) were donated by

69. See Luke Goodrich, Mexico’s Separation of Church and State, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2010,
1:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703740704575095704065365166.
70. See Brett Scharffs, Can Public Reason Accommodate Conscience?, INT’L CTR. FOR L.
&
RELIGION
STUD.,
http://www.iclrs.org/index.php?pageId=1&linkId=205&cont
entId=2010&blurbId=17119 (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).
71. See Smith, supra note 9, at 312.
72. Ferrari, supra note 9, at 761.
73. 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
74. Id. at 464–66.
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groups with longstanding ties to the [city’s] community.’” 75 The
Summum monument qualified under neither. 76
The Supreme Court held that the city’s rejection of one
monument, while accepting others is “a form of government speech”
which is “not subject to the Free Speech Clause.” 77 The Supreme
Court distinguished between private and government speech,
finding that the former requirement is bound by the Free Speech
Clause, but the latter is not. 78 Under government speech, the
government can “select the views that it wants to express” in a
forum that it creates, since it cannot express every single viewpoint. 79
If the government creates a forum, it can then limit the types of
groups or subjects discussed there and make restrictions “that are
reasonable and viewpoint neutral.” 80
Additionally, the Court held that a city cannot violate the
Establishment Clause when putting permanent monuments on its
property. 81 But a city creates its identity through these monuments.
Thus it is allowed to use “factors [such] as esthetics, history, and
local culture” in choosing which monuments it will accept. 82 A city
does not need to proclaim what message it intends to send by its
monuments. 83 Nor is a monument limited in its interpretation by
what the donors intended the message to be. 84
Despite this language, the Court does not fully explain how the
Ten Commandments monument meets these criteria because these
facts and arguments were not fully before it. The Court seems to

75. Id. at 465.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 481.
78. Id. at 467. For a further discussion on the uncertain line between the Free Speech
and Establishment Clauses in this case see generally RonNell Andersen Jones, Pick Your Poison:
Private Speech, Government Speech, and the Special Problem of Religious Displays, 2010 BYU L.
REV. 2045 (2010).
79. Summum, 555 U.S. at 468; see also id. (quoting Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1,
12–13 (1990)) (holding that government would likely not function “‘[i]f every citizen
were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with which
he disagreed’”).
80. Id. at 470. For more on the Court’s treatment of public forums see generally
Timothy Zick, Summum, the Vocality of Public Places, and the Public Forum, 2010 BYU L.
REV. 2203 (2010).
81. Summum, 555 U.S. at 468.
82. Id. at 472.
83. Id. at 473.
84. Id. at 473–74.
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suggest that the Ten Commandments monument helps create the
city’s identity. But the Court does not specify how the monument
qualifies as esthetics, history, or local culture. The city did limit its
monuments to those that “either (1) directly relate to the history of
[the city], or (2) were donated by groups with longstanding ties to
the [city’s] community.” 85 There is no explanation on how a Ten
Commandments monument relates to Pleasant Grove’s history. So it
must be assumed that the monument was accepted because the
Fraternal Order of Eagles had longstanding ties to the community 86
and that this is what the Court most likely qualified as local culture.
While allowing any religion or religiously related group to
donate simply because they have been in the community for a long
time could lead to promoting a particular religion, it will not so long
as the monument’s purpose is not to establish that particular religion
but to celebrate its impact on the community. The resulting principle
is that the city can use a religious expression in a public monument
as long as it is celebrating the cultural impact of that religion or
religiously oriented group on the community. However, the
monument must not violate the Establishment Clause. So far as the
Court knew, the monument was valid.
One question with this approach is whether the city would have
allowed monuments from smaller religious groups that did have
longstanding ties to the community or were important culturally.
The Summum faith did not have any major ties to the community,
but suppose there was a significant minority of the population that
was Muslim, Buddhist, or Sikh, would their monuments be
accepted? The Court does not address this issue because it was not
before it. If the city did not accept a minority religion’s monument,
then the test would really be about whether the monument came
from a large, “mainstream” religion (i.e. Christianity). But those
were not the facts before the Court. However, the city would most
likely have allowed a monument from Mormons because they are a
majority faith in Utah and they have longstanding ties to the
community, including settling most of the towns. A monument
depicting Mormon pioneers could certainly pass this test despite its
religious influence. If no minority religious monuments are allowed,
then it would appear that part of the monument’s purpose is to

85. Id. at 465.
86. Id.
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promote a particular religion, Christianity, instead of just celebrating
its cultural impact on the community. However, since the Court did
not have a chance to address this issue, it is uncertain how the Court
would have held. So, we turn to Salazar to see what guidance it
provides on the role of religion in government activities.
B. Salazar v. Buono
A year later in Salazar v. Buono, 87 the Court addressed another
religious monument in the public square. Buono had obtained an
injunction forbidding the government “from permitting the display
of [a] Latin cross” on public land. 88 Both lower courts found that
the cross violated the Establishment Clause because it “conveyed an
impression of governmental endorsement of religion.” 89 The
government did not appeal this injunction to the Supreme Court, so
the judgment became final. 90 Congress responded by passing a law
requiring the land to be transferred to the private organization that
first erected the cross in exchange for a portion of the organization’s
land. 91 That organization could keep the land so long as the property
was maintained “as a memorial commemorating United States
participation in World War I and honoring the American veterans of
that war.” 92 Buono contended this was an attempt to avoid fulfilling
the injunction he was granted and obtained another injunction
preventing the land transfer. 93 In issuing this second injunction, the
district court did not consider whether the government’s attempt to
maintain the cross still violated the Establishment Clause, but it did
consider the land-transfer act and found that it violated the purpose
of the injunction. 94 When the case reached the Supreme Court, the
government challenged Buono’s standing, but the Court found that
87. 559 U.S. 700 (2010). It should be noted that Buono is a plurality opinion with
three justices agreeing on the language that follows in this section. Id. at 704. Justice Alito
agreed with the entire opinion, except he disagreed with the plurality that it should be
remanded, finding that the facts sufficiently supported a resolution of the case. Id. at 723
(Alito, J., concurring). Justices Scalia and Thomas believed that the court should not address
the merits because the plaintiff had no standing. Id. at 729 (Scalia, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 708 (plurality opinion).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 709.
91. Id. at 709–10.
92. Id. at 710.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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Buono had standing in this case because he obtained a “‘judicially
cognizable’ interest in ensuring compliance with [the injunction].” 95
The Court then turned to the merits of the injunction holding
that all courts must address any “significant changes in the law or
circumstances underlying an injunction.” 96 Because the district court
based its first injunction on perception but based its final injunction
on “suspicion of an illicit governmental purpose” (i.e. establishing a
religion), it failed to decide if “the original finding of wrongdoing
continue[d] to justify the court’s intervention.” 97 The Court found
that the injunction’s general purpose of “avoiding the perception of
governmental endorsement” would not oppose the government’s
decision to transfer the land to a private party. 98 Because of the
“highly fact-specific” inquiry needed to evaluate Congress’s landtransfer act, the Court remanded the case to the district court. 99
The Court also found that the cross was originally erected to
commemorate World War I veterans, not to endorse Christianity. 100
It also found that seventy years of existence had intertwined “the
cross and the cause it commemorated . . . in the public
consciousness.” 101 Accordingly, Congress was recognizing its
historical, not its religious meaning. 102 When Congress had to decide
how to comply with the injunction, it chose to accommodate a
symbol that “has complex meaning beyond the expression of
religious views.” 103 The Court found that “avoiding governmental
endorsement does not require eradication of all religious symbols in
the public realm,” and “[t]he Constitution does not oblige
government to avoid any public acknowledgment of religion’s role in
society.” 104
The Court then questioned the validity of the district court’s
reasonable person test, but assumed that even under that test, the
cross would withstand a challenge. 105 The district court focused
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
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Id. at 712.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 718–19.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 722.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 716.
Id.
Id. at 717.
Id. at 718–19.
Id. at 720–21.
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solely on the cross’s religious meaning, instead of “its background
and context.” 106 A Latin cross does more than represent Christianity,
it is also “used to honor and respect those whose heroic acts, noble
contributions, and patient striving help secure an honored place in
history for this Nation and its people. . . . It evokes thousands of
small crosses in foreign fields marking the graves of Americans who
fell in battles . . . .” 107
The Court clearly followed the same test by finding that the
purpose of the cross was not to promote Christianity, but to
remember the fallen soldiers. It also reiterated one of the main
reasons for allowing public religion, namely that religion has a major
role in society and should not be completely ignored by the
government in order to avoid an appearance of establishment.
It could be argued that the cross only reminds us of all the
fallen Christian soldiers (who happen to be the vast majority
during World War I) and thus is still promoting Christianity over
other religions. But, while the cross does not represent the
religious views of all the fallen soldiers, it does represent the
graveside marker for an overwhelming majority of them. We are
remembering these soldiers in their death and sacrifice for us,
which is symbolized by the one indicator of where they lie, the
cross. So while there may be other ways to memorialize fallen
troops, the government does not need to reject a cross simply
because it is also associated with a particular religion.
Additionally, the Stevens dissent points out that the Park Service
did not allow a Buddhist to set up a smaller monument
commemorating the death of Buddhist soldiers. 108 So, once again the
test seems to apply only if the religion is a majority faith (i.e.
Christianity). However, the rejection of the Buddhist monument was
not the issue before the court and so they could not rule on it. The
issue was whether transferring the land with the cross to a private
entity still violated the injunction. The Court found that it did not
and its dicta about the cross strongly suggests that the cross would
be appropriate to retain as long as it continued to fulfill a secular
purpose. But it was not until Town of Greece v. Galloway that the
Court was directly confronted with the issue of public religion.

106. Id. at 721.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 745 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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C. Town of Greece v. Galloway
Five years after Buono, the Court considered the clearest case of
involvement of religion in governmental action in Town of Greece v.
Galloway. 109 The town of Greece, New York began their monthly
board meetings with a prayer given by a local minister who was
almost always Christian because “nearly all of the congregations in
town were Christian.” 110 After two citizens complained about the
prayers being all Christian, the town made an extra effort to invite
non-Christian religious leaders. 111 These two citizens then sued the
town, alleging that this practice violated the Establishment Clause
“by preferring Christians over other prayer givers and by
sponsoring sectarian prayers.” 112 They sought an injunction limiting
the prayers to “‘inclusive and ecumenical’ [ones] that referred only
to a ‘generic God’ and would not associate the government with
any one faith or belief.” 113
Following precedent in Marsh v. Chambers, 114 the Court found
that legislative prayer does not violate the Establishment Clause. 115
The analysis is not based on any other Establishment Clause test, but
“by reference to historical practices and understandings.” 116 So, it is
not an exception to the Establishment Clause because legislative
prayer was an accepted practice by the Founders at the time they
adopted the First Amendment. 117
The Court 118 also held that the purpose of legislative prayer is to
“lend[] gravity to public business, remind[] lawmakers to transcend
petty differences in pursuit of a higher purpose, and express[] a
common aspiration to a just and peaceful society.” 119 Lawmakers, not

109. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
110. Id. at 1816.
111. Id. at 1817 (explaining how the “town invited a Jewish layman and the chairman of
the local Baha’i temple to deliver prayers” and accepted the request of a Wiccan priestess).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
115. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819.
116. Id. (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 670 (1989)).
117. Id. at 1818–19.
118. It should be noted that Justices Thomas and Scalia did not join this part of the
opinion. Id. at 1835 (Thomas, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 1818 (plurality opinion).
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the public, are the principal audience for these prayers. 120 A prayer for
them may “set[] the mind to a higher purpose and thereby ease[]
the task of governing . . . , reflect the values they hold as private
citizens . . . , [and] show who and what they are without denying the
right to dissent by those who disagree.” 121 As Marsh explains,
legislative prayer is a “symbolic expression [of] a ‘tolerable
acknowledgement of beliefs widely held,’” and has “become part of
the fabric of our society.” 122 These prayers “acknowledg[e] the
central place that religion, and religious institutions, hold in the lives
of those present.” 123 They recognize that “many Americans deem
that their own existence must be understood by precepts far beyond
the authority of government to alter or define . . . .” 124 They also
have a “ceremonial purpose.” 125 Legislative prayer is “part of our
heritage and tradition, part of our expressive idiom, similar to the
Pledge of Allegiance, inaugural prayer, or the recitation of ‘God save
the United States and this honorable Court’ at the opening of this
Court’s sessions.” 126 Doing away with this traditional practice would
“begin anew the very divisions along religious lines that the
Establishment Clause seeks to prevent.” 127
The Court then found that precedent does not require
“nonsectarian or ecumenical prayer[s].” 128 Marsh explicitly held that
the “‘content of the prayer is not of concern to judges,’ provided
‘there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited
to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or
belief.’” 129 Nonsectarian prayers would require the government to

120. Id. at 1825.
121. Id. at 1825–26; see also Orrin G. Hatch, Keynote Address, 2015 BYU L. REV. 585,
591–92 (“The argument against basing laws on religious considerations rests on the view that
religion is a purely private matter and, therefore, public debate and political decision-making
may legitimately be based only on so-called public reason, which is defined as excluding
religious values and expression. This view . . . . insists that religion is limited to belief, not
behavior; that religious exercise is individual, not collective; and, especially, that religion is
something that should be conducted in private, not in public.”).
122. Id. at 1818–19 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)).
123. Id. at 1827.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1828.
126. Id. at 1825.
127. Id. at 1819.
128. Id. at 1820.
129. Id. at 1821–22 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–795 (1983)).
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unconstitutionally supervise and censor religious speech. 130
“Government may not mandate a civic religion that stifles any but
the most generic reference to the sacred . . . .” 131 Even if these
prayers were required, it is likely impossible to determine what
would “qualif[y] as generic or nonsectarian” and ministers should
not be asked to “set aside their nuanced and deeply personal beliefs
for vague and artificial ones.” 132 Prayers may make “passing reference
to religious doctrines,” because “[o]ur tradition assumes that adult
citizens, firm in their own beliefs, can tolerate and perhaps appreciate
a ceremonial prayer delivered by a person of a different faith.” 133
Only “a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize,
or betray an impermissible government purpose,” will violate the
Establishment Clause. 134 The legislature must follow a
nondiscrimination policy, but it does not need to search “for nonChristian prayer givers in an effort to achieve religious balancing.” 135
This would require excessive “government entanglement with
religion” by requiring “‘wholly inappropriate judgments about the
number of religions [it] should sponsor and the relative frequency
with which it should sponsor each.’” 136 However, legislators cannot
“direct[] the public to participate in the prayers, single[] out
dissidents for opprobrium, or indicate[] that their decisions might be
influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the prayer opportunity.” 137
Because none of these issues were occurring, the Court found that
the prayers did not violate the Establishment Clause. 138
Thus, the Court’s approach in Town of Greece explicitly endorses
religious expression during governmental activities. While the Court
focused on secular purposes for legislative prayer, it also included in
its purposes the religious expression of individuals. 139 It also explains
these prayers in civil religion terms by pointing out the prayer’s
130. Id. at 1822.
131. Id. (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992) (“The suggestion that
government may establish an official or civic religion as a means of avoiding the establishment
of a religion with more specific creeds strikes us as a contradiction that cannot be accepted.”)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1823.
134. Id. at 1824.
135. Id.
136. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 617 (Souter, J., concurring)).
137. Id. at 1826.
138. Id. at 1828.
139. Town of Greece. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1826–27 (2014).
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ceremonial purpose, similar to other traditions in our civil religion. 140
However, the Court also flatly rejected a nonsectarian approach,
favoring one where any religion can participate and the government
did not have to give preference to any particular sect. 141
It could be argued that this case is just the third example of the
Court allowing the government to use only Christian religious
expressions, but this ignores the facts of the case. The town had
almost no non-Christian congregations and never denied the prayer
to a non-Christian religious leader. The Court would need to
assume facts not in evidence to say that this situation was the
government promoting Christianity. Instead, the government was
allowing local religious individuals to express themselves in a
government setting in a way that benefited the community’s
governmental activities. Forcing the town to obtain outside
individuals changes the focus to the individual giving the prayer
instead of the prayer’s purpose. If the town had denied nonChristians the opportunity to pray or if the Christian ministers had
attacked other non-Christian faiths in the prayer, then the town
would be establishing Christianity. But these were not the facts of
the case and so should not govern its final outcome. 142
In light of the outcomes of these cases, this Comment will now
discuss how the reasoning of these cases (both in dicta and the
holdings) shows the Robert Courts acceptance of public religion.
III. THE ROBERT’S COURT’S ACCEPTANCE OF PUBLIC RELIGION
A. The Court’s Guiding Public Religion Principles
Throughout all
consistent principles
religious elements
government cannot

three cases, the Roberts Court follows two
in its reasoning. First, the government can use
for non-religious purposes. Second, the
exclude non-majority religions that want to

140. Id. at 1825, 1828.
141. Id. at 1820–24.
142. But see id. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that since the non-Christian
prayers were only allowed after the initial complaints from citizens, the practice was promoting
Christianity over other religions until they were threatened with a lawsuit). However, at no
point was the town intentionally discriminating against non-Christians. To force them by
threat of lawsuit to reach out to other religions makes the town intentionally discriminate in
favor of particular religions. And while the town could have potentially done a better job at
letting these other faiths know about this opportunity, see id. at 1839–40, it did not have to,
see id. at 1824 (majority opinion).
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participate, but it also does not need to make an extra effort to
ensure that multiple religions are represented. This two-pronged
approach will allow greater religious expression within the country’s
civil religion framework and thus offers a possible solution to the
problems critics have pointed out about the current circumstances.
Under the Court’s approach, religious expressions can be used as
long as they promote a secular purpose. 143 This can include honoring
fallen veterans 144 or helping legislators transcend their differences
before they begin the process of lawmaking. 145 However, it can also
include secular purposes as tied to religion. It allows individuals to
express their religion publicly, 146 and it recognizes the importance of
religion in American culture and history, 147 as well as in the
individual lives of many Americans. 148
This approach will also lead to the cultivation of a new public
religion to replace the current Judeo-Christian version. This public
religion would allow all forms of religious belief to be expressed in
the public square as long as they don’t promote one religious sect
over another but instead help establish an American community. This
would be a civil religion that seeks to transcend the differences
between religious sects, and even those who are non-religious, in
order to focus on goals that all desire. It would fulfill Justice
Kennedy’s description of prayers at city council meetings in a way
that the current Judeo-Christian version cannot.
As will be argued in the next section, the key is finding a
common denominator that can unite Americans without diluting
its influence on each individual. Judeo-Christianity cannot
inspire or unite us as Americans as a civil religion is supposed to
143. A recent article criticizes this approach arguing that religious people seeking to keep
public religious symbols by giving them secular meanings are leading their society to the very
end that they hoped to avoid, further secularization. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Pasquale
Annichino, Cross, Crucifix, Culture: An Approach to the Constitutional Meaning of Confessional
Symbols, 13 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 101, 167–68 (forthcoming 2015).
144. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 709–10 (2010).
145. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825.
146. See id. at 1826–27.
147. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009); see also Jean-Paul
Willaime, Towards a Recognition and Dialogue Secularism in Europe, 2015 BYU L. REV. 779,
798–99 (“Merely considering the individual aspects of religious and philosophical attitudes
fails to account for the cultural strata of societies, the fact that particular religious dimensions
have played a more significant role in the history of the societies and in their configuration as
state-national communities.”).
148. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1827.
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do if it excludes a growing minority of American religious
people 149 or references only the most abstract religious principles
that do not motivate anyone. 150 With these thoughts in mind,
this Comment now turns to see how the Court’s approach holds
up against the problems found with the current American civil
religion and its alternatives.
B. A Solution to the Problems of the Current American Civil Religion
According to critics, the current American civil religion faces five
problems. 151 This section shows how the Court’s approach addresses
each of these problems.
The first problem with the old American civil religion is that
there is no consistent approach to the government’s allowance of
religious symbols and expressions. 152 The Court’s approach solves
this; the government can use and allow religious expressions and
symbols in its activities as long as 1) its purpose is not to promote
religion and 2) it does not preclude any religion from expressing
itself when the government allows another to do so. 153 This rule can
consistently and logically address each of the major public religion
challenges facing the courts.
Under this approach, Pleasant Grove City could have a Ten
Commandments monument as long as 1) its purpose is to build the
city’s identity through a tie to its history or culture, 154 and 2) other
monuments that have a tie to religion are also allowed if they meet
the same criteria. 155 Similarly, the government could allow a Latin
cross on public lands as long as 1) its purpose is to depict fallen
soldiers, not promote Christianity 156 and 2) other religious symbols

149. See Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 285.
150. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1822.
151. See supra Section I.B.
152. See Mirsky, supra note 14.
153. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. 1811; Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010);
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
154. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 472.
155. See id. at 465 (mentioning the city’s requirements for accepting a monument and,
thus implying based on the facts, that the Ten Commandments met them because the donors
had long standing ties to the city while the Summum monument did not because it was an
out-of-town religion). But, as mentioned before, other minority faiths must be allowed to
donate if they do meet this same criteria.
156. Buono, 559 U.S. at 715–17, 721–22.
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are allowed for the same purpose. 157 Also, legislators could allow any
minister to begin the meeting with a prayer or other opener as long
as 1) the purpose of the prayer focuses on helping the legislators
understand the gravity of their task and rise above their differences,
not to promote or denigrate a religious belief or unbelief 158 and 2)
any religious leader can offer the ceremonial opening. 159
Additionally, this approach would extend to other areas where
government and religion mix. The phrase “under God” in the
Pledge of Allegiance could be found permissible since 1) its purpose
is to remind citizens that their rights come not from the
government, but from a source outside of it 160 and 2) an individual
can replace that phrase with an alternative that fulfills this same
purpose. 161 Federal officials can be sworn in using a Bible and the
phrase “so help me God” as long as 1) its purpose is to help the
officials fully commit and devote their service to their country and
not their own personal interests and 2) other religious books and
phrases (or other deeply meaningful documents such as the U.S.
Constitution for non-believers) can be used instead. 162 This idea still
conforms with the notion that “the state may not . . . declare any
particular religious doctrine to be the true one, or enact laws that
clearly imply such a declaration of religious truth.” 163
The second problem for critics lies in the belief that the
American civil religion favors Judeo-Christian beliefs over others, 164
157. See, e.g., id. at 745 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Buono v.
Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cirt. 2004) (explaining, disapprovingly, that the Park Service
denied “an adherent of the . . . Buddhist faith” from putting up a similar religious memorial to
fallen WWII soldiers).
158. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1818–19, 1826–27.
159. See, e.g., id. at 1824 (holding that the town must have “a policy of nondiscrimination”).
160. See Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“The phrase ‘under God’ is a recognition of our Founder’s political philosophy that a power
greater than the government gives the people their inalienable rights. Thus, the Pledge is an
endorsement of our form of government, not of religion or any particular sect.”).
161. For example, those of the Jewish faith can use “under Yahweh,” Muslims “under
Allah,” and even non-believers could use “under natural rights” or a similar idea.
162. See Frederic J. Frommer, Congressman to Be Sworn in Using Quran, ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Jan.
3,
2007,
4:07
PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/01/03/AR2007010301179.html (detailing how a Muslim
congressman used a Quran to be sworn into the U.S. Congress).
163. KOPPELMAN, supra note 63, at 3.
164. See Mirsky, supra note 14, at 1240, 1246. Some argue that it really favors
conservative Christians over all others. See Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 278, 296–
97, 300–01.
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especially by ignoring and alienating non-monotheists. 165 The second
part of the Court’s approach clearly does not allow this. When
religious individuals or groups are participating in a public event,
they must be allowed to use their own religious terminology and
symbols. Thus even a Wiccan priestess must be allowed to give the
opening legislative prayer. 166 Similarly, any religion may seek a
holiday display as long as other religions are also allowed to do so.
As to the first part of the Court’s approach, many symbols and
expressions in our civil religion do seem to favor Christianity,
monotheism, or religion generally. 167 However, it is impossible to
find a unanimous expression of belief in any sphere. For example,
some American’s still disagree with the idea that all men were
created equal. 168 Yet this does not mean that the government should
remain silent on important issues. 169 As the Court held in Summum,
government could not exist “if every citizen were to have a right to
insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with which he
disagreed.” 170 In order to perpetuate the political myth of the
American nation, the government needs to use a civil religion. 171
While there may be many Americans who do not believe in the terms
or symbols used by the civil religion, 172 the government can and must
use the most common and historical beliefs available to perpetuate its
community. This approach fulfills this need.
Third, critics argue that through civil religion the government is
placing religion at the head of public discussions. 173 However,
government does a similar thing with race every time that it
celebrates black history month. 174 This commemoration exists even
165. See Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 276, 301–02, 305; see also Ferrari supra
note 9, at 757.
166. See Town of Greece. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1817 (2014).
167. See Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 278, 296–97, 300–01.
168. See Smith, supra note 9, at 312.
169. Id.
170. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (quoting Keller v. State
Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1990)).
171. See supra Part I.A.
172. Compare McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 893 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that 97% of Americans are monotheists), with Gedicks & Hendrix, supra
note 26, at 288 (estimating that only 66–75% of Americans are monotheists).
173. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
174. See Kevin J. Seamus Hasson, A Modest St. Paddy’s Day Proposal, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
16, 2009, 11:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123725627239551027. The same
could also be said of ethnicity with every St. Patrick’s Day parade. See id.
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though a Constitutional Amendment prohibits this racial
differentiation. 175 Yet, this does not mean that the government
cannot publicly acknowledge the different aspects of our culture,
whether race or religion. 176 This is seen in Town of Greece, where the
Court held that legislative prayers “acknowledg[e] the central place
that religion, and religious institutions, hold in the lives of those
present.” 177 They recognize that “many Americans deem that their
own existence must be understood by precepts far beyond the
authority of government to alter or define.” 178 Additionally, a prayer
can “show who and what [the legislators] are without denying the
right to dissent by those who disagree.” 179 Thus the purpose of this
civil religion is not to promote religion, but to acknowledge its role
in society as a builder and unifier. 180
This might be labeled as sanctioned pluralism. Not only do many
Americans deeply care about their beliefs, but they also have a wide
variety of beliefs. The courts must strive to create a system that
allows each of those beliefs to coexist with one another. Religious
scholars have argued that establishing a system that allows this
coexistence of many beliefs is essential to social stability. 181 The
courts must sanction the right of every belief system to express itself
publicly in order to show other belief systems that all are welcome
175. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Hasson, supra note 174.
176. See Hasson, supra note 174; see also Vanja-Ivan Savić, Still Fighting God in the Public
Arena: Does Europe Pursue the Separation of Religion and State Too Devoutly or Is It Saying It
Does Without Really Meaning It?, 2015 BYU L.REV. 679, 681 (“[W]hen playing solely by
secularism’s rules, the state ignores that religious guidelines are more than just a part of history
and tradition; they are actual living pieces of culture and, therefore, part of the state’s public
and legal existence.”) (citations omitted); Willaime, supra note 147, at 798–99 (“[P]ublic
authorities [have recognized] the historical and cultural importance that one or several specific
religious traditions have had in a given country. . . . [In] trying to promote a sense of equality
by putting all religions on the same level . . . seems like an attempt to apply an abstract scheme
that denies history and reality. Merely considering the individual aspects of religious and
philosophical attitudes fails to account for the cultural strata of societies, the fact that particular
religious dimensions have played a more significant role in the history of the societies and in
their configuration as state-national communities.”) (citations omitted).
177. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1827 (2014); see also Salazar v.
Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 718–19 (2010) (“The Constitution does not oblige government to
avoid any public acknowledgment of religion’s role in society.”).
178. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1827.
179. Id. at 1826.
180. See Buono, 559 U.S. at 718–19.
181. W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION: NATIONAL,
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 13–14 (2010) (citing John Locke, A
Letter Concerning Toleration (William Popple trans., Huddersfield 1796)).
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and free to express themselves. The plaintiffs in these cases seem to
focus on one of two unfortunate alternatives. They either argue that
the government is asserting Christianity as the main, approved
religion in the United States by sanctioning only its symbols using
secular terms, 182 or they argue for the prohibition of any government
use of religion since it establishes that religion. 183 Both alternatives
tell every belief system (religious or not) that they are not welcome
in the public square unless you are either Christian or non-religious.
But that is not what made the American experience so unique. 184
Since the early colonial days, there were many different religions and
over time each colony (and eventually state) had to allow other
religions to be included. 185 With this Court’s approach to civil
religion, they will officially sanction pluralism.
Fourth, civil religion contaminates sectarian religion and puts
pressure on the government to interpret religious symbols as lacking
in religious significance. 186 While there is still a common belief
expressed through aspects of the civil religion, the Court’s approach
would make clear that any religion can express itself through
governmental activities. Now, any person with any belief can perform
the ceremonial opening of a town board meeting. 187 It might be
argued as well that now any religion can seek a government holiday
display as long as it fulfills the secular purpose for having the
displays. Additionally, the Court has directly rejected the idea of a
watered down, generic civil religion. 188 As it affirmed, religious
leaders should not be asked to “set aside their nuanced and deeply
personal beliefs for vague and artificial ones.” 189 There is no
establishment problem as long as any religious or non-religious belief
can be freely and sincerely expressed. And while Summum and Buono
focus solely on the secular purpose of the religious symbols, 190 Town

182. Brett Scharffs, Creation and Preservation in the Constitution of Civil Religion, 41
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 985, 999 (2010).
183. Id.
184. See DURHAM & SCHARFFS, supra note 181 at 18.
185. Id.
186. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
187. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1824 (2014).
188. See id. at 1820–24.
189. See supra text accompanying note 132.
190. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009); Salazar v. Buono, 559
U.S. 700, 721 (2010).
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of Greece allows prayers to be done for a secular purpose but without
removing the religious significance of the prayer. 191
Thus this slightly departs from Andrew Koppelman’s approach
which requires “that religion’s goodness be understood at a high
enough level of abstraction that the state takes no position on any
live religious dispute.” 192 Koppelman’s approach allows abstract
religion, but does not allow the government to include any religious
symbols or expressions that further its secular purpose. 193 This
approach will continue this dilution of religion that many Americans
and Town of Greece 194 directly reject.
Fifth and finally, the critics argue that American civil religion is
being narrowed by conservative Christians to only represent their
specific values and beliefs. 195 It is true that all of the cases focused on
here had a tie to Christianity, 196 but the second part of the Court’s
approach ensures that non-Christians are not excluded from these
opportunities. In the first two cases, it was not the Christian message
of the monuments that was allowed by the courts, but their historical
meaning. 197 Simply because Christianity is closely tied into important
historical events does not mean that those events should be banned
from government recognition. 198 However, the government must
also allow other religious symbols that fulfill that same purpose, an
issue that was not before the courts in any of these cases. 199 In Town
of Greece, the Court stated that prayer as a ceremonial part of
191. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1826–27.
192. KOPPELMAN, supra note 63, at 2.
193. See id.
194. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. 1822.
195. See supra note 40.
196. Summum dealt with the Ten Commandments monument which could be seen as
Judeo-Christian, but is definitely Christian. See 555 U.S. 460, 464–465 (2009). Buono faced
the issue of using a Latin cross, a symbol that often represents Christianity. See 559 U.S. 700,
715, 721 (2010). Town of Greece nearly always had Christian ministers give the ceremonial
prayer because the town was predominantly of that faith. See 134 S. Ct. at 1816.
197. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 472; Buono, 559 U.S. at 716.
198. See Buono, 559 U.S. at 718–19.
199. In Summum, the Court rejected the minority’s attempt to be included not because
it was a non-Christian faith, but because inclusion of its monument would destroy the secular
purpose of the city to celebrate organizations that had an important impact on the community.
See Summum, 555 U.S. at 472. In Buono, the Court was not determining if the cross violated
the Establishment Clause, so it did not need to look at the fact that a Buddhist monument was
not allowed at the site. Compare Buono, 559 U.S. at 706 with id. at 745 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Finally in Town of Greece, no religious leader was ever denied the opportunity to
pray even if they were not intentionally recruited. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1824.

870

SMITH.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

845

1/16/2016 2:55 PM

Commandments, Crosses, & Prayers

government is open to any religion and does not need to be
exclusively the job of a paid Christian minister as was traditionally
done. 200 As previously mentioned, any and all beliefs can express
themselves in the legislative opening ceremony, which is certainly not
an endorsement of Christianity.
While not perfect at addressing these concerns, the Court’s
approach in these three cases arguably responds to each criticism and
does so in a way that can be agreeable to most. And as the Court
said in Town of Greece, “[o]ur tradition assumes that adult citizens,
firm in their own beliefs, can tolerate and perhaps appreciate a
ceremonial prayer delivered by a person of a different faith.” 201
Additionally, this approach also potentially solves the problems
caused by the aforementioned alternatives. 202
C. A Solution to the Problems Caused by Proposed Alternatives
Through these three cases, the Roberts Court implicitly rejects
the alternative versions of the civil religion in favor of principles that
could lead to a new version of civil religion.
First, while the Roberts Court’s approach seems similar to
aspects of Italy’s version, 203 it has one key difference that solves a
major problem found in the latter’s approach: the separation of
church and state. 204 This separation allows all religions the chance to
participate in the public square and is key to the Court’s approach.
All religions can perform the ceremonial opening of a legislative
session, use their revered book or document to be sworn into office,
and place their holiday displays on government property. People of
any belief can express themselves as they choose in the public square.
It also overcomes issues with Mirsky’s method. 205 His solution of
a civil religion devoid of any actual religious elements might lead to
less support for “social justice and human rights,” hold less sway
over the nation’s citizens, and publicly treat religion’s role
historically and culturally as second class to other ideologies and
beliefs. 206 The Court’s approach avoids all three of these
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1824.
See id. at 1823.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 43–46.
See Ferrari supra note 9, at 756.
See supra text accompanying notes 47–51.
See supra Part I.B.
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consequences. It allows a civil religion that retains the religious
elements that can better support social justice and human rights. 207 It
will also better unite Americans. 208 For example, a federal official is
sworn into office using a Bible and the phrase “so help me God.”
While the Constitution and “so help me America” could be used
instead, for many religious people these alternatives would not
express as deep of a commitment to faithfully serve their country as
their own religious book and higher power. The key lies not in
barring religion from the public square but in allowing any religion
or non-religion to use whatever best leads to this deep
commitment. 209 Similarly, the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of
Allegiance is meant to convey that rights and liberties come from a
source outside of the government and thus cannot be taken away by
the state. 210 Using a phrase such as “under natural rights” cannot stir
the soul of most Americans and thus would fail to effectively remind
them of where their rights come from. Additionally, the Court’s
approach will continue to respect religion’s role in history and
culture without promoting it over other ideologies or beliefs that
have also played important roles in these spheres. This allows
religions to publicly celebrate holidays just as other groups are
allowed to do even though the government is banned from
discriminating among them (e.g. races with Black History month
and ethnicities with St. Patrick’s Day). 211
Finally, this approach overcomes the problems caused by both
Gedicks and Hendrix’s approach 212 and the French’s laïcité, 213
including avoiding a secular basis that is actually not neutral toward
religion and has no way of producing common values without
looking to religion. While the Court’s approach is not perfectly
neutral toward specific religions, it still allows a wide range of
religious practices to be involved in its governmental activities and
seeks to include as many religions as possible in its necessary

207. See supra note 63.
208. See supra note 64; see also Bellah, supra note 18, at 9–11 (describing the use of civil
religion during the Civil War to unify the nation).
209. See supra note 163 (detailing how a Muslim congressman used a Quran to be sworn
into the U.S. Congress).
210. See Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1037 (2010).
211. See Hasson, supra note 174.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 52–55.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 56–61.
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declaration of a common American belief. It also allows the
government to look to religious values to determine its own, even if
it cannot base its decision on a religious argument. Thus, even
though it is still imperfect in its approach, the Roberts Court’s
approach best balances the need for a common belief to unify the
nation with the policy of nondiscrimination among religions.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, every government needs some type of belief system
to help create a community or nation amongst its citizens. While
there are several systems to fill this need, a public religion best
balances the need for a deep tie to the community with the ability of
citizens to still identify with the nation despite differences in
religious belief. Neither a state church nor thin procedural values can
achieve this balance. However, there have been serious and
legitimate concerns raised about public religion, especially as seen in
the United States.
The Roberts Court has addressed these concerns in three of its
cases. First, the Court allowed government use of religious
expressions as long as they had a secular purpose. Second, it did not
deny any religion or belief system the opportunity to participate or
be used in these public expressions as long as they fulfill the same
secular purpose. This two-pronged approach will help develop a new
American public religion that fosters greater inclusion of all beliefs
while still maintaining an overall American identity based on a
commitment to understanding and transcendence of differences.
This approach will also overcome many of the criticisms laid against
the current public religion by creating a consistent approach,
treating all religions equally in public expression, allowing all
religions to be an important part of public discussions, retaining the
relevance and purity of each religion, and broadening instead of
narrowing the scope of inclusion. Finally, it ensures that the
government continues to officially sanction pluralism and public
religious expressions.
The Roberts Court will most likely continue to face more cases
involving the government’s public use of religion. The Court must
continue to realize the importance of promoting religious diversity
through its public religion by following the principles laid out in
these three cases and by developing a more defined test. Otherwise
it will continually be striving to find new ways to justify the
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inclusion of religious symbols and expressions under secular terms
while not allowing other religious symbols and expressions to be
used as well or it will decide to exclude religion entirely from
governmental expression. This continued schizophrenic approach
will only lead to more confusion. This will be especially important
for lower courts, which may understandably misinterpret the
Supreme Court’s precedent and fall into the traps of complete
exclusion of all religions from public use or exclusion of all
religions except Judeo-Christianity.
Instead, religion in general should continue to be treated equally
with other non-religious philosophies and ideologies. The
government should only allow it to be used when it furthers a
purpose that is non-religious, such as uniting Americans as a political
community. Meanwhile, the debate will continue among scholars as
to whether this approach really succeeds or if it can be replaced by
something better suited to Americans’ needs.
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